outcome knowledge, judges immediately assimilate it There are conflicting hypotheses regarding the effect with what they already know about the event in quesof a surprising outcome on hindsight judgment. Ac-tion" (Fischhoff, 1975, p. 297), and the outcome informacording to the hypothesis presented in this paper, high tion is effortlessly assimilated in the schematic reprelevels of surprise will lead to the elimination or rever-sentation of the domain in question. Consistent with sal of hindsight bias. The feeling of surprise serves as this view, Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) demonstrated a cue to subjects making them aware of the fact that that outcome information is not so surprising in hindoutcome information is largely different from whatever they knew about the event. Subjects under these sight. The perceiver, who assimilates the outcome inforconditions seek explanations to the outcome and "ef-mation naturally and effortlessly, is unaware of its effortless assimilation," the most accepted theoretical fects and is not surprised in hindsight. Hence, the account for the hindsight bias, is less likely. The alter-reaction "I knew it all along." 
not only might hindsight predictions not be in line with classical hindsight bias, but the bias might be eliminated or even reversed. From a theoretical viewpoint, Hindsight bias, identified and documented by Fisch-they noted that surprising outcomes trigger "special hoff (1975) , refers to the tendency to judge events as processing." It has been postulated that processing of more predictable when outcome information is known. this type stems from attempts to explain unexpected The importance of this bias stems from its distorting incongruent behaviors (Hastie, 1984) or, more genereffect on the ability to learn from the past and the ally, from engaging in a causal search to explain event potential underestimation of the informativeness of outcomes (Weiner, 1985) . For example, Srull (1981) facts. Hindsight bias has been demonstrated in judg-noted that incongruent behaviors were recalled better ments of political, historical, social, and medical events than congruent behaviors. Pyszczynski and Greenberg (e.g., Detmer, Fryback & Gassner, 1978; Fischhoff, (1981) identified a tendency to offer a relatively large 1977; Fischhoff, 1980; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Leary, number of excuses and justifications upon receipt of 1981; Powell, 1988; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977;  expectancy-disconfirming information. Mazursky and Synodinas, 1986) . Christensen-Szalanski and Will- Ofir (1990) proposed that the feeling of surprise followham's (1991) meta analysis of 128 studies demonstrated ing the receipt of outcome information and the related the robustness of this bias.
reinforcing processes may result in the reaction, "I could Fischhoff 's (1975) theoretical basis for hindsight bias not have expected it to happen." is generally accepted by most researchers in this area.
In contrast to the above "reversal" hypothesis, According to this theoretical account, "upon receipt of Schkade and Kilbourne (1991) posited that a surprising disconfirming outcome would lead to the reinforcement Co-authorship is equal. The authors acknowledge the support of the Davidson and Kmart Research Centers at the Hebrew University. of hindsight bias. The degree of disconfirmation was Parts of this research were carried out while the first author was hypothesized as moderating the degree of hindsight a Visiting Professor at the Haas School of Business, University of bias: Thus, the higher the perceived disconfirmation hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1982) , findings support-end, we conducted three experiments examining various aspects of our extended framework. We demoning its existence, such as those reported by Schkade strated that in the face of highly surprising outcomes, and Kilbourne (1991), can hardly be disputed. However, hindsight probability estimates shift in the opposite if the surprise levels in their experiments did not reach direction to the outcome (i.e., the reversal hypothesis) a needed threshold, judgments in line with the hindand, conversely, when the level of surprise is lower, sight bias would be expected. Unfortunately, neither hindsight probability estimates shift in the direction of surprise levels nor perceived disconfirmation were meathe outcome (i.e., the hindsight bias). Experiment 1 and sured in their experiments and, therefore, this manipuExperiment 2 examine the reversal effect using two lation could not be assessed.
different experimental settings and stimuli. ExperiIndeed, if outcome information is only moderately ment 3 includes additional experimentation and analysurprising or not surprising at all, hindsight bias effects ses testing both the hindsight bias and its reversal. are expected; that is, judgments consistent with the In line with the standard hindsight bias experimental reaction, "I knew it all along," as envisioned by Fischprocedure, experimental subjects were asked to ignore hoff. There is no reason or evidence at this point to outcome information when providing their judgments. suggest that the processes leading to assimilation of
The results indicate that relatively nonsurprised suboutcome information are interrupted. On the contrary, jects provide hindsight probability estimates that are the "effortless" assimilation process suggested by Fischin line with classical hindsight bias whereas hindsight hoff seems to be a quite plausible explanation in the predictions made by highly surprised subjects are concase of unsurprising outcome information. That such a sistent with the reaction, "I could not have expected process is likely to operate, has been demonstrated in this to happen." Various methodological concerns and Fischhoff 's (1975) study and many other related replicaalternative explanations are addressed and discussed tions.
along with the accommodation of related findings If the outcome is highly surprising, however, the feelwithin the extended framework. ing of surprise along with the cognitive effort invested in explaining the outcome, may serve to signal "I could EXPERIMENT 1 not have known it." Acknowledged surprise alerts the perceiver to the gap between the outcome information Method and his/her assumed knowledge about the event. Given
Subjects. Subjects were 70 undergraduate students the feeling of surprise and the cognitive effort invested at the Rothberg School of Overseas Students at the in the search for explanations and causal reasons for the Hebrew University. Subjects were recruited individuoutcome, it is less likely that "effortless" and "natural" ally and compensated for their participation. restructuring of domain knowledge will occur, as in the case of a less surprising outcome. Acknowledged surProcedure and design. Subjects were presented prise serves as a cue that the outcome could not have with information regarding a man with a heart condibeen foreseen. Surprising outcome information may tion whose doctor had recommended a bypass operalead people to reflect their overall reaction regarding tion. Subjects were also informed that 2% of such pathe inability to foresee the outcome by reducing the tients die from the operation itself. Subjects were predictability of its occurrence. Acknowledged surprise, randomly assigned to three groups: one experimental therefore, is hypothesized to be associated with the and two control conditions. Subjects in the experimenelimination or even the reversal of the hindsight bias. tal condition were informed that the operation had Thus, we propose the following role of surprise in failed and the man had died. These subjects were asked hindsight judgments: If outcomes are only moderately to predict the probability of the success of the operation surprising or not surprising at all, it is hypothesized and to provide disconfirmation and surprise ratings. that judgments will be in line with the outcome informa-Following other experiments in the hindsight research tion. It may well be that moderate inconsistency and paradigm (e.g. Fischhoff, 1975) , 24 experimental subdisconfirmation can be resolved with minimal cognitive jects who received the outcome were asked to ignore effort and integrated into the knowledge representation the outcome information when providing their judgof the event. If, however, the outcome is highly surpris-ments. In the first control group (henceforth, outcome ing, we expect the hindsight bias to be eliminated or control), 24 subjects were told the outcome and asked even reversed.
to provide only disconfirmation and surprise ratings. The main objective of this study is to examine the This control group served to test the hypothesis that role of surprise in hindsight probabilistic judgments surprise ratings may be influenced by other measures.
In the second control group (henceforth, the no-outcome and to test the above two opposing hypotheses. To this control), 22 subjects did not receive any outcome infor-group, the lower prediction is in line with empirical evidence (Lynch & Ofir, 1988) suggesting that when mation. These subjects were only asked to predict the probability of the success of the operation. The results only the (high) prior is presented, judgments based upon it are somewhat less extreme. Experimental subobtained for this control group were compared with the results obtained for the experimental group to test for jects who were provided with the outcome did not expect the patient to die, with a mean disconfirmation of 1.65 hindsight bias or its reversal.
(level one on the 7-point disconfirmation scale was Stimulus material. The following modified "heart labeled "Worse than expected"). These subjects were condition" problem (Baron & Hershey 1988 ) was pre-also quite surprised (mean ϭ 5.29 on the 7-point scale). sented to the experimental group and the outcome con-Their predictions were significantly higher than those trol group: "A 55-year-old man was suffering from a of no-outcome control subjects. The classical bias would heart condition. He had to stop working due to chest imply hindsight judgments (experimental group) to be pain. He enjoyed his work and did not want to stop. lower than foresight judgments (no-outcome control). His pain also interfered with other activities, such as The key to understanding the results obtained for the travel and recreation. A type of bypass operation would experimental subjects is their disconfirmation and surrelieve his pain and increase his life expectancy from prise at the outcome leading to a reaction of the type 65 to 70. However, 2% of the people who undergo this "I could not have expected the man to die," and hence, operation die from the operation itself. His physician higher rather than lower hindsight predictions. Experirecommended to go ahead with the operation. This phy-ment 2 generalizes this finding using a different experisician had no problems in the past diagnosing and ad-mental stimulus and setting. vising his patients on similar medical issues. The operation was carried out by the experienced staff of a large EXPERIMENT 2 hospital. The operation failed and the man died."
No-outcome subjects were asked to provide predic-Method tions in probabilities (0-100) regarding the success of the man's operation. Experimental subjects were asked Procedure and design. Fifty-eight patients, all with to predict the success of the operation "as they would prior experience with a specific brand of mouthwash, have, had they not known the outcome" (Fischhoff, were invited to participate in the experiment while 1975, p. 293). Subjects in the experimental group and awaiting treatment in a dental clinic. Respondents were the outcome control group were also asked to indicate randomly assigned to two groups, 31 to the experimenthe degree to which their expectations were discon-tal group and 27 to the control group. All subjects were firmed on a seven-point scale: "The outcome of the oper-shown a copy of an advertisement promoting the focal ation is:" (1 ϭ Worse than expected; 4 ϭ As expected; brand for about 3 min. The main message conveyed by 7 ϭ Better than expected). They were also asked to the advertisement was that the brand removes plaque. indicate their surprise at the outcome (1 ϭ Not sur-More explanations reinforcing the main message were prised at all; 7 ϭ Very surprised).
given in smaller print. Subjects in the experimental group were given additional information regarding a Results and Discussion research project conducted in a leading university which had found that regular water was as effective as Preliminary analysis. The surprise ratings of experthis particular brand in removing plaque and that both imental and outcome control subjects were not signifitreatments (regular water and this particular brand) cantly different (t(46) Ͻ 1). Nor were their disconfirmawere ineffective in removing plaque. This outcome, action ratings significantly different (t(46) Ͻ 1). Providing cording to a pretest, was perceived as surprising. Conprobability judgments before surprise and disconfirmatrol subjects were not given any information regarding tion ratings did not affect the latter. Subjects in both the effectiveness of the brand. Subjects in both groups groups were surprised and the outcome disconfirmed were presented with a short questionnaire. Finally, all their expectations. subjects were debriefed. Hindsight predictions. The results are in line with the prediction that a surprising outcome will either Stimulus material. Subjects in the experimental and control groups were shown an advertisement proeliminate or reverse the direction of the hindsight bias: Predictions in the experimental cell were significantly moting the mouthwash. The heading announced that "Brand X removes plaque." This message was reinhigher (mean ϭ 97.2; median ϭ 98.0) than those in the no-outcome control group (mean ϭ 93.1, median ϭ forced by informing subjects that plaque is a layer of bacteria which sticks to the teeth and that it is the 96.5), (t(44) ϭ 2.62, p Ͻ .01). Although one might expect a 98% success rate prediction in the no-outcome control main cause of cavities, gum infection, and tartar buildup. They were told that as the toothbrush cannot 1, these results are consistent with the reaction "I could not have expected this outcome" and, as hypothesized, get to all of the hard-to-reach places, brushing alone cannot fight plaque, and the plaque just stays on the demonstrate reversal of hindsight bias. teeth. The advertisement claimed that if Brand X is used before brushing teeth, it removes plaque, main-EXPERIMENT 3 tains oral hygiene, and fights diseases caused by plaque.
Subjects in the experimental group were also in-Method formed, on a separate page, that extensive research had been conducted in a medical school of a leading Subjects. Subjects were 242 American undergraduuniversity to assess the effectiveness of Brand X in ate students at the Rothberg School for Overseas Sturemoving plaque and preventing gum disease. Hun-dents at the Hebrew University. Subjects were recruited dreds of families using the focal brand, as well as a individually and they were compensated for their parlarge group of families using regular water to rinse their ticipation. mouth, had been monitored and checked. The subjects were told that the research results clearly demonProcedure, design, and stimuli. The experiment involved two experimental groups and two control groups. strated that regular water was as effective as the focal brand in removing plaque and preventing gum disease, Subjects in all groups were shown a copy of a painting and told to examine it carefully. They were asked to and that the effectiveness of both was found to be very low.
indicate the probability that one of the following had painted the picture: (1) A 12-year old boy, (2) Picasso, Dependent measures. Both groups were given a (3) Renoir, and, (4) Other-none of the above. Subjects short questionnaire. Subjects in the experimental group were instructed that their probabilistic judgments had were instructed to ignore the information regarding the to add up to 100. Experimental subjects were asked research and its results when answering the prediction to ignore outcome information when providing their question. Experimental subjects were asked to ignore judgments and to provide surprise ratings. outcome information when providing the judgment for After being shown the painting and before providing the question, "what is the probability in percentages the prediction, 66 subjects in the first experimental that regular everyday usage of Brand X is effective cell were told that the painter was Picasso. Seventyin removing plaque?" Experimental subjects were also six subjects in the second experimental cell were told asked to indicate their surprise regarding the results that the painter was not Picasso, not Renoir, and not of the research on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ Not surprised a 12-year old boy (i.e., the correct answer was "Other"). at all, 7 ϭ Very surprised). Control subjects were asked The painting chosen for this experiment was undistinto provide the prediction only.
guished. Revealing the identity of the painter (i.e., Picasso) was expected to be surprising. In contrast, reResults and Discussion vealing that the picture was not painted by Picasso, Renoir, or a 12-year old boy (in the second experimental Subjects in the experimental group expressed surprise at the research results (mean ϭ 6.1 on the 7-point cell) was expected to be relatively unsurprising. Subjects in the two experimental groups were asked to scale). Their predictions regarding the effectiveness of the brand in removing plaque were quite high (mean ignore the outcome information when providing their judgments. ϭ 77.6%; median ϭ 80%). In contrast, and as hypothesized, the control subjects provided significantly lower
In one of the two control groups, subjects were not given any outcome information. These (72) subjects predictions (mean ϭ 61.8%, median ϭ 60%) than the experimental subjects (t(56) ϭ 2.61, p Ͻ .02). Note that were requested to give predictions only. The objective of this no-outcome control group was to provide the the results in the experimental group were obtained after the subjects had received information indicating foresight judgments needed for comparison with hindsight judgments in the two experimental groups. In the the opposite outcome. Thus, the results demonstrate quite strongly that the finding of the research project second control group, subjects were told that Picasso had painted the picture. These (28) subjects were reprovided to the experimental subjects significantly influenced their hindsight predictions. The predictions quired only to rate their surprise at the outcome on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ Not surprised at all; 7 ϭ Very surprovided by the experimental subjects (who were surprised by the outcome) were significantly higher in prised). This control group enabled further testing of the hypothesis that surprise ratings may be influenced hindsight than the predictions of the control subjects. In line with the results and conclusions of Experiment by other measures. for the two experimental cells and the no-outcome control cell are presented in Table 1 . The columns in Table  1 represent the two experimental groups (the "Picasso" consistent with the classical hindsight bias. In fact, the bias was eliminated: Mean predictions in the experioutcome group and the "Other" outcome group) and the no-outcome control group. The rows in Table 1 display mental group were 14.04 vs 19.26 in the control group (Mann-Whitney U test-not significant). It may well the prediction probabilities of the four outcome options. We expected that due to high surprise, subjects who be that this level of surprise is sufficient to eliminate the bias but not to reverse it. Note that the hindsight were informed that Picasso was the artist would indicate lower hindsight probabilities than would control judgments are in the opposite direction to that predicted by the hindsight bias. subjects who were not informed about the outcome (see the bold figures in columns 1 and 3 corresponding to
In order to further investigate this experimental group (Picasso outcome), subjects were split according the Picasso option in the second row). Conversely, we expected that due to low level of surprise, subjects who to their surprise ratings, with the median surprise rating (5 on a 7-point scale) serving as the cutoff point. were informed that the outcome was Other would assign higher hindsight probability than would no-out-According to our hypothesis, the predictions of subjects who were surprised were expected to be significantly come control subjects (see the bold figures in columns 2 and 3 corresponding to the Other option in the lower than those of subjects who were not surprised.
The results are consistent with this hypothesis (see fourth row).
Indeed, examination of the means suggests that pro- Table 2 ). The predictions of experimental subjects who were surprised were significantly lower (mean probviding the Picasso outcome eliminates hindsight bias, and the predictions are in the reversal direction. In ability ϭ 5.7, median ϭ 1.0; n ϭ 41) than those of subjects who were not surprised (mean probability ϭ contrast, and in line with the hindsight bias, providing subjects with the Other outcome leads to higher predic-28.7, median ϭ 30.0; n ϭ 24) (Mann-Whitney U test, p Ͻ .0001). As intended by the split, one group (mean tions than those provided by no-outcome control subjects. A more detailed statistical analysis is provided ϭ 6.3) was significantly more surprised than the other group (mean ϭ 2.6), (t(63) ϭ 14.6, p Ͻ .0001). Moreover, below.
The outcome that neither Picasso, Renoir, nor a 12-the predictions of subjects who were surprised were significantly lower than those of no-outcome control year old boy had painted the picture was perceived as unsurprising (mean ϭ 2.9 on a 7-point scale). This subjects (Mann-Whitney U test, p Ͻ .003). This finding suggests reversal of the bias. In contrast, the predicoutcome demonstrates the classical hindsight effect as envisioned by Fischhoff (1975) : The mean prediction tions of subjects who were not surprised were significantly higher than those of no-outcome control subjects that Other had painted the picture was 43.4% (median ϭ 38.0) in the experimental group vs 28.8% (median ϭ (means: 28.7 vs 19.3; medians 30.0 vs 10.0), (MannWhitney U test, p Ͻ .001). This finding is in line with 22.5) in the no-outcome control group (Mann-Whitney U test, p Ͻ .003).
1 The Other outcome, as expected, was the classical hindsight bias. perceived as unsurprising and experimental subjects provided higher predictions than no-outcome control (Fischhoff, 1975) . Non-parametric (probabilities) statistics are therefore used.
These results support the hypothesis that surprising were perceived to be quite surprising. Surprising outcomes are associated with more attempts at explanaoutcomes eliminate the hindsight bias. Moreover, after the split, highly surprised subjects provided predictions tion, justification, and better recall of incongruent evidence than confirming outcomes. Surprise is suggesting reversal of the bias, whereas subjects who were not surprised exhibited the classical hindsight acknowledged and serves as cue to the fact that the outcome information is largely different from what is bias. In addition, the Other outcome, which was perceived as unsurprising, was associated with classical known about the event. "Effortless assimilation" is therefore unlikely in the face of a surprising outcome. hindsight predictions.
The experiments presented here indicate that acknowledged surprise is associated with judgments that are
GENERAL DISCUSSION
not biased in the direction of the outcome. In other words, given a surprising outcome, the hindsight bias is eliminated or even reversed.
Surprising Outcome and Predictions in Hindsight
and Foresight Potential methodological problems. Some concern may exist regarding the scale employed to demonstrate The highly unexpected 1987 stock market crash has served as the context for the portrayal of two alternative the hindsight bias. This is particularly relevant to a previous study demonstrating the reversal of the bias retrospective responses. Schkade and Kilbourne (1991) suggested that decision makers may be prone to hind- (Mazursky & Ofir, 1990) : Can rating scales measuring subjective uncertainty be used instead of the subjective sight bias in that they tend to exaggerate the a priori predictability of the behavior of the stock market. Con-probability scale (0-100) to investigate the hindsight bias? Are these rating scales reliable and valid? Might versely, Mazursky and Ofir (1990) cited the statement " . . . . in my wildest dreams I would not have imagined these scales bias the results? Recent research conducted by Ofir and Reddy (1996) comparing rating scales and this" (Richard Barris, New York Times, October 20, 1987) which is inconsistent with the hindsight bias ten-the subjective probability scale suggests that rating scales are reliable and that their method variance is dency. Such a response to an acknowledged surprising outcome may result in either the elimination of the minimal. In fact, from a psychometric perspective, rating scales performed better than the classical subjective hindsight bias or its reversal. Fischhoff 's (1975) theoretical explanation for the probability scale (Ofir & Reddy, 1996) . Rating scales have been used previously in research focusing on the hindsight bias has been adopted by most researchers. Outcome information, according to Fischhoff (1975) , hindsight bias and related paradigms (e.g., Creyer & Ross 1993) . The results of the current investigation assimilates with the schematic representation of the event or domain knowledge. This process, termed by based on the subjective probability scale, which support our previous investigation based on a seven-point likeliFischhoff "creeping determinism," is "natural" and "effortless" (Fischhoff, 1975) . Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) hood rating scale, suggest that a surprising outcome either eliminates or reverses the hindsight bias. The have also demonstrated that outcomes in hindsight are not so surprising. similarity between the results based on both types of scale suggests that they both measure the same underSchkade and Kilbourne (1991) hypothesized that a surprising outcome would lead to reinforcement of the lying construct of subjective uncertainty.
The question whether the response format of rating bias. The empirical evidence presented in this paper rejects this latter hypothesis. Schkade and Kilbourne's scales might bias the results is problematic and deserves attention. Research has shown that the design (1991) findings supporting the hindsight bias are in line with many studies demonstrating the robustness and wording of scales can affect the results (e.g., Guilford, 1954; Nunnally, 1967; Ofir & Reddy, 1996) . For of the hindsight bias. However, in the absence of any measurement of the level of surprise experienced by sub-example, in the hindsight paradigm, Mark and Mellor (1991) employed a three-category scale in a task investijects, it is difficult to interpret their findings. It may well be that the outcomes used in their experiments gating the foreseeability of being laid off. They measured reactions associated with the hindsight bias using were not sufficiently surprising or that they did not reach the threshold of surprise needed in order to dem-the following three response categories: "I'm not sure I ever saw it coming;" "I wasn't sure, but suspected it onstrate the elimination or reversal of the bias. Indeed, if the outcomes in these experiments were not highly was coming;" and "I saw it coming all the way" (p. 571). This is not a scale measuring uncertainty. Moreover, surprising, hindsight bias would be expected.
Various manipulation checks indicated that the out-this scale is unbalanced in that it does not allow for the measurement of reactions in the opposite direction comes used in the experiments presented in this paper
